Konferenzbeitrag

Information in a Monopolist's Credence Good Market

Credence goods markets, such as those for car repairs and medical treatments, are generally characterized by an ex-ante and ex-post information asymmetry between the uninformed buyer and the informed seller. Previous literature demonstrates that efficiency and fraud in a monopolist credence goods market are crucially determined by two key assumptions concerning the verifiability of the quality provided and the expert's liability. In this paper, we identify the information distribution among customers as a third important determinant. Contrary to basic intuition, we find that improving the level of customers' information might actually lead to welfare losses. Further, we highlight the supremacy of the assumption regarding the expert's liability for determining whether informed customers have real effects on market outcomes. On the other hand and in contrast to traditional models, the verifiability of the quality provided is only of secondary importance.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2019: 30 Jahre Mauerfall - Demokratie und Marktwirtschaft - Session: Economic Theory - Information and Uncertainty ; No. G01-V2

Classification
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
Analysis of Health Care Markets
Subject
Credence Goods
Liability
Verifiability
Information.

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Jost, Peter-J.
Reik, Steffen
Ressi, Anna
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
(where)
Kiel, Hamburg
(when)
2019

DOI
doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102694
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Konferenzbeitrag

Associated

  • Jost, Peter-J.
  • Reik, Steffen
  • Ressi, Anna
  • ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft

Time of origin

  • 2019

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