Arbeitspapier
Management compensation and market timing under portfolio constraints
This paper shows that portfolio constraints have important implications for management compensation and performance evaluation. In particular, in the presence of portfolio constraints, allowing for benchmarking can be bene cial. Benchmark design arises as an alternative effort inducement mechanism vis-a-vis relaxing portfolio constraints. Numerically, we solve jointly for the manager's linear incentive fee and the optimal benchmark. The size of the incentive fee and the risk adjustment in the benchmark composition are increasing in the investor's risk tolerance and the manager's ability to acquire and process private information.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CFR Working Paper ; No. 11-16 [rev.]
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- Thema
-
market timing
incentive fee
benchmarking
portfolio constraints
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Agarwal, Vikas
Gómez, Juan-Pedro
Priestley, Richard
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR)
- (wo)
-
Cologne
- (wann)
-
2012
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Agarwal, Vikas
- Gómez, Juan-Pedro
- Priestley, Richard
- University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR)
Entstanden
- 2012