Privacy in implementation

Arbeitspapier

In most implementation frameworks, agents care only about the outcome and not at all about the way in which it was obtained. Additionally, typical mechanisms for full implementation involve the complete revelation of all private information to the planner. In this paper I consider the problem of full implementation with agents who may prefer to protect their privacy. I analyze the extent to which privacy-protecting mechanisms can be constructed under various assumptions about agents' predilection for privacy and the permissible game forms.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1561

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Noncooperative Games
• Subject: Nash implementation ; subgame perfect implementation ; privacy ; Nash implementation ; subgame perfect implementation ; privacy

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Gradwohl, Ronen
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
• (where): Evanston, IL
• (when): 2013

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/97237
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET