Arbeitspapier

Relative rewards within team-based compensation

How to design compensation schemes to motivate team members appears to be one of the most challenging problems in the economic analysis of labour provision. We shed light on this issue by experimentally investigating team-based compensations with and without bonuses awarded to the highest contributors in teams. A purely team-based compensation scheme induces agents to voluntarily cooperate while introducing an additional relative reward increases effort and efficiency only when the bonus is substantial. In this case, however, the data suggests that tournament competition crowds out voluntary cooperation within a team.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 2423

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Irlenbusch, Bernd
Ruchala, Gabriele K.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2006

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2009030953
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Irlenbusch, Bernd
  • Ruchala, Gabriele K.
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2006

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