Arbeitspapier

Delegation and Rewards

We study experimentally whether anti-corruption policies with a focus on bribery might be insufficient to uncover more subtle ways of gaining an unfair advantage. In particular, we investigate whether an implicit agreement to exchange favors between a decision-maker and a lobbying party serves as a legal substitute for corruption. Due to the obvious lack of field data on these activities, the laboratory provides an excellent opportunity to study this question. We find that even the pure anticipation of future rewards from a lobbying party suffices to bias a decision-maker in favor of this party, even though it creates negative externalities to others. Although future rewards are not contractible, the benefitting party voluntarily compensates decision-makers for partisan choices. In this way, both receive higher payoffs, but aggregate welfare is lower than without a rewards channel. Thus, the outcome mirrors what might have been achieved via conventional bribing, while not being illegal.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 378

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Externalities
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Thema
delegation
gift exchange
corruption
lobbying
negative externalities
Kooperative Führung
Korruption
Interessenpolitik
Externer Effekt
Austauschtheorie (Soziologie)
Test

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Vetter, Stefan
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
(wo)
München
(wann)
2012

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13176
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13176-7
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Vetter, Stefan
  • Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)

Entstanden

  • 2012

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