Arbeitspapier
Commitment to self-rewards
Self-administered rewards are ubiquitous. They serve as incentives for personal accomplishments and are widely recommended as tools for overcoming self-control problems. However, it seems puzzling why self-rewards can work: the prospect of a reward has a motivating force only if the threat of self-denial of the reward after low performance is credible. We explain how a rational forward-looking individual may achieve commitment to self-rewards, by applying Köszegi and Rabin's (2006) model of endogenous reference point formation to a self-regulation problem. Our results show why and when self-regulation built on self-rewards can be successful and thus illustrate the power, but also the limits, of self-rewards.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 4049
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Economics of Contract: Theory
- Thema
-
Self-control
motivation
self-reinforcement
time inconsistency
reference-dependent preferences
Motivation
Präferenztheorie
Willingness to pay
Eigeninteresse
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Koch, Alexander K.
Nafziger, Julia
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2009
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-20090323189
- Letzte Aktualisierung
- 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Koch, Alexander K.
- Nafziger, Julia
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2009
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