Democracy, Populism and Hyperinflation[s]: Evidence from Latin America

Konferenzbeitrag

We test for the populist view of inflation in Latin America between 1970 and 2007. The empirical results - based on the relatively novel panel time-series data and analysis - confirm the theoretical prediction that recently elected governments coming into power after periods of political dictatorship, and which are faced with high economic inequality, end up generating high inflation and macroeconomic instability. All in all, we suggest that the implementation of democracy as such requires not only the 'right political context' - or an appropriately constrained executive - to work well, but it also must come with certain economic institutions (e.g. central bank independence and a credible and responsible fiscal authority), institutions which would raise the costs of pursuing populist policies in the first place.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Hannover 2010 ; No. 47

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Price Level; Inflation; Deflation ; Studies of Particular Policy Episodes ; Economic History: Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations: Latin America; Caribbean ; Fiscal and Monetary Policy in Development ; Economywide Country Studies: Latin America; Caribbean
• Subject: Polarisation ; populism ; hyperinflation ; Latin America.

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Bittencourt, Manoel
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Verein für Socialpolitik, Ausschuss für Entwicklungsländer
• (where): Göttingen
• (when): 2010

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39985
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET