Arbeitspapier

Discretion, Productivity and Work Satisfaction

In Bartling, Fehr and Schmidt (2012) we show theoretically and experimentally that it is optimal to grant discretion to workers if (i) discretion increases productivity, (ii) workers can be screened by past performance, (iii) some workers reciprocate high wages with high effort and (iv) employers pay high wages leaving rents to their workers. In this paper we show experimentally that the productivity increase due to discretion is not only sufficient but also necessary for the optimality of granting discretion to workers. Furthermore, we report representative survey evidence on the impact of discretion on workers' welfare, confirming that workers earn rents.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 383

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
high-performance work systems
wages
discretion
gift exchange
job satisfaction
Kooperative Führung
Arbeitsproduktivität
Arbeitszufriedenheit

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bartling, Björn
Fehr, Ernst
Schmidt, Klaus M.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
(wo)
München
(wann)
2012

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13171
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13171-9
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bartling, Björn
  • Fehr, Ernst
  • Schmidt, Klaus M.
  • Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)

Entstanden

  • 2012

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