Arbeitspapier
Discretion, Productivity, and Work Satisfaction
In Bartling, Fehr and Schmidt (2012) we show theoretically and experimentally that it is optimal to grant discretion to workers if (i) discretion increases productivity, (ii) workers can be screened by past performance, (iii) some workers reciprocate high wages with high effort and (iv) employers pay high wages leaving rents to their workers. In this paper we show experimentally that the productivity increase due to discretion is not only sufficient but also necessary for the optimality of granting discretion to workers. Furthermore, we report representative survey evidence on the impact of discretion on workers’ welfare, confirming that workers earn rents.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Munich Discussion Paper ; No. 2012-28
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Kooperative Führung
Arbeitsproduktivität
Arbeitszufriedenheit
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bartling, Björn
Fehr, Ernst
Schmidt, Klaus M.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
- (wo)
-
München
- (wann)
-
2012
- DOI
-
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.14193
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-14193-1
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bartling, Björn
- Fehr, Ernst
- Schmidt, Klaus M.
- Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
Entstanden
- 2012
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