Arbeitspapier
Political pressures and monetary mystique
Central bank independence and transparency have become best practice in monetary policy. This paper cautions that transparency about economic information may not be beneficial in the absence of central bank independence. The reason is that it reduces monetary uncertainty, which could make the government less inhibited to interfere with monetary policy. In fact, a central bank could use monetary mystique to obtain greater insulation from political pressures, even if the government faces no direct cost of overriding. As a result, economic secrecy could be beneficial and provide the central bank greater political independence.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1999
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Central Banks and Their Policies
Monetary Policy
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
-
Geldpolitik
Staatliche Information
Zentralbankautonomie
Geheimhaltung
Public Choice
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Geraats, Petra Maria
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2007
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Geraats, Petra Maria
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2007