Arbeitspapier

Political pressures and monetary mystique

Central bank independence and transparency have become best practice in monetary policy. This paper cautions that transparency about economic information may not be beneficial in the absence of central bank independence. The reason is that it reduces monetary uncertainty, which could make the government less inhibited to interfere with monetary policy. In fact, a central bank could use monetary mystique to obtain greater insulation from political pressures, even if the government faces no direct cost of overriding. As a result, economic secrecy could be beneficial and provide the central bank greater political independence.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1999

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Central Banks and Their Policies
Monetary Policy
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Thema
Geldpolitik
Staatliche Information
Zentralbankautonomie
Geheimhaltung
Public Choice
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Geraats, Petra Maria
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2007

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Geraats, Petra Maria
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2007

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