Diversification, Risk Aversion and Expectation in a Holdout Scenario

Arbeitspapier

We argue a holdout is not a destructive investor behaviour but a rational investment decision. This investment decision is characterised by the mean-variance approach. We investigate intercreditor conflict by diverse portfolio structure. We demonstrate that at some point during the Greek (2012) and Argentine (2005) debt restructuring programs it was reasonable for the investor to hold out. This model shows that the investment decision is based on the portfolio structure, risk aversion and expected payment of the debtor, so there is no free-rider behaviour. On the contrary, the investor harms herself when playing a destructive or uncooperative strategy.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5527

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation ; National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General ; National Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
• Thema: sovereign debt ; holdout ; mean-variance approach ; collective action clause

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Eggert, Wolfgang ; Stephan, Maximilian ; Temme, Janine ; von Ungern-Sternberg, Handirk
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2015

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/123175
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ