Arbeitspapier

Expectation-Based Loss Aversion and Strategic Interaction

This paper provides a comprehensive analysis regarding strategic interaction under expectation-based loss-aversion. First, we develop a coherent framework for the analysis by extending the equilibrium concepts of Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) to strategic interaction and demonstrate how to derive equilibria. Second, we delineate how expectation-based loss-averse players differ in their strategic behavior from their counterparts with standard expected-utility preferences. Third, we analyze equilibrium play under expectation-based loss aversion and comment on the existence of equilibria.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 02/2015

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Thema
Non-Cooperative Games
Expectation-Based Loss Aversion
Reference-Dependent

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Dato, Simon
Grunewald, Andreas
Müller, Daniel
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2015

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Dato, Simon
  • Grunewald, Andreas
  • Müller, Daniel
  • University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)

Entstanden

  • 2015

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