Arbeitspapier
Expectation-Based Loss Aversion and Strategic Interaction
This paper provides a comprehensive analysis regarding strategic interaction under expectation-based loss-aversion. First, we develop a coherent framework for the analysis by extending the equilibrium concepts of Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) to strategic interaction and demonstrate how to derive equilibria. Second, we delineate how expectation-based loss-averse players differ in their strategic behavior from their counterparts with standard expected-utility preferences. Third, we analyze equilibrium play under expectation-based loss aversion and comment on the existence of equilibria.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 02/2015
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- Thema
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Non-Cooperative Games
Expectation-Based Loss Aversion
Reference-Dependent
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Dato, Simon
Grunewald, Andreas
Müller, Daniel
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Dato, Simon
- Grunewald, Andreas
- Müller, Daniel
- University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
Entstanden
- 2015