Arbeitspapier

Securitization and moral hazard: Evidence from a lender cutoff rule

Credit score cutoff rules result in very similar potential borrowers being treated differently by mortgage lenders. Recent research has used variation induced by these rules to investigate the connection between securitization and lender moral hazard in the recent financial crisis. However, the conclusions of such research depend crucially on understanding the origin of these cutoff rules. We offer an equilibrium model in which cutoff rules are a rational response of lenders to perapplicant fixed costs in screening. We then demonstrate that our theory fits the data better than the main alternative theory already in the literature, which supposes cutoff rules are exogenously used by securitizers. Furthermore, we use our theory to interpret the cutoff rule evidence and conclude that mortgage securitizers were in fact aware of and attempted to mitigate the moral hazard problem posed by securitization.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Public Policy Discussion Papers ; No. 09-5

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Financial Crises
General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Ratings and Ratings Agencies
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Economic History: Financial Markets and Institutions: U.S.; Canada: 1913-
Thema
Securitization
Moral Hazard
Asymmetrische Information
Subprime-Hypothek
Kreditwürdigkeit
Finanzmarktkrise
Theorie
USA

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bubb, Ryan
Kaufman, Alex
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
(wo)
Boston, MA
(wann)
2009

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bubb, Ryan
  • Kaufman, Alex
  • Federal Reserve Bank of Boston

Entstanden

  • 2009

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