Artikel

Bandits in the lab

We experimentally implement a dynamic public-good problem, where the public good in question is the dynamically evolving information about agents' common state of the world. Subjects' behavior is consistent with free-riding because of strategic concerns. We also find that subjects adopt more complex behaviors than predicted by the welfare-optimal equilibrium, such as noncut-off behavior, lonely pioneers, and frequent switches of action.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Quantitative Economics ; ISSN: 1759-7331 ; Volume: 12 ; Year: 2021 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 1021-1051 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Classification
Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
Subject
dynamic games
Dynamic public-good problem
exponential bandits
laboratory experiments
learning
strategic experimentation

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Hoelzemann, Johannes
Klein, Nicolas Alexandre
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
The Econometric Society
(where)
New Haven, CT
(when)
2021

DOI
doi:10.3982/QE1389
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Hoelzemann, Johannes
  • Klein, Nicolas Alexandre
  • The Econometric Society

Time of origin

  • 2021

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