Artikel
Bandits in the lab
We experimentally implement a dynamic public-good problem, where the public good in question is the dynamically evolving information about agents' common state of the world. Subjects' behavior is consistent with free-riding because of strategic concerns. We also find that subjects adopt more complex behaviors than predicted by the welfare-optimal equilibrium, such as noncut-off behavior, lonely pioneers, and frequent switches of action.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Quantitative Economics ; ISSN: 1759-7331 ; Volume: 12 ; Year: 2021 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 1021-1051 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
- Subject
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dynamic games
Dynamic public-good problem
exponential bandits
laboratory experiments
learning
strategic experimentation
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Hoelzemann, Johannes
Klein, Nicolas Alexandre
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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The Econometric Society
- (where)
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New Haven, CT
- (when)
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2021
- DOI
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doi:10.3982/QE1389
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Hoelzemann, Johannes
- Klein, Nicolas Alexandre
- The Econometric Society
Time of origin
- 2021