Artikel

Bandits in the lab

We experimentally implement a dynamic public-good problem, where the public good in question is the dynamically evolving information about agents' common state of the world. Subjects' behavior is consistent with free-riding because of strategic concerns. We also find that subjects adopt more complex behaviors than predicted by the welfare-optimal equilibrium, such as noncut-off behavior, lonely pioneers, and frequent switches of action.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Quantitative Economics ; ISSN: 1759-7331 ; Volume: 12 ; Year: 2021 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 1021-1051 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
Thema
dynamic games
Dynamic public-good problem
exponential bandits
laboratory experiments
learning
strategic experimentation

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Hoelzemann, Johannes
Klein, Nicolas Alexandre
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The Econometric Society
(wo)
New Haven, CT
(wann)
2021

DOI
doi:10.3982/QE1389
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Hoelzemann, Johannes
  • Klein, Nicolas Alexandre
  • The Econometric Society

Entstanden

  • 2021

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