Arbeitspapier

Static and dynamic efficiency of irreversible health care investments under alternative payment rules

The paper studies the incentive for providers to invest in new health care technologies under alternative payment systems, when the patients' benefits are uncertain. If the reimbursement by the purchaser includes both a variable (per patient) and a lump-sum component, efficiency can be ensured both in the timing of adoption (dynamic) and the intensity of use of the technology (static). If the second instrument is unavailable, a trade-off may emerge between static and dynamic efficiency. In this context, we also discuss how the regulator could use the control of the level of uncertainty faced by the provider as an instrument to mitigate the trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency. Finally, the model is calibrated to study a specific technology.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 2010,130

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
Thema
Health Care
Investments

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Levaggi, Rosella
Moretto, Michele
Pertile, Paolo
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(wo)
Milano
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Levaggi, Rosella
  • Moretto, Michele
  • Pertile, Paolo
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Entstanden

  • 2010

Ähnliche Objekte (12)