Arbeitspapier

Static and dynamic efficiency of irreversible health care investments under alternative payment rules

The paper studies the incentive for providers to invest in new health care technologies under alternative payment systems, when the patients' benefits are uncertain. If the reimbursement by the purchaser includes both a variable (per patient) and a lump-sum component, efficiency can be ensured both in the timing of adoption (dynamic) and the intensity of use of the technology (static). If the second instrument is unavailable, a trade-off may emerge between static and dynamic efficiency. In this context, we also discuss how the regulator could use the control of the level of uncertainty faced by the provider as an instrument to mitigate the trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency. Finally, the model is calibrated to study a specific technology.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 2010,130

Classification
Wirtschaft
Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
Subject
Health Care
Investments

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Levaggi, Rosella
Moretto, Michele
Pertile, Paolo
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(where)
Milano
(when)
2010

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Levaggi, Rosella
  • Moretto, Michele
  • Pertile, Paolo
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Time of origin

  • 2010

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