An Evolutionary Approach to Congestion

Arbeitspapier

Using techniques from evolutionary game theory, we analyze potential games with continuous player sets, a class of games which includes a general model of network congestion as a special case. We concisely characterize both the complete set of Nash equilibria and the set of equilibria which are robust against small disturbances of aggregate behavior. We provide a strong evolutionary justification of why equilibria must arise. We characterize situations in which stable equilibria are socially efficient, and show that in such cases, evolution always increases aggregate efficiency. Applying these results, we construct a parameterized class of congestion tolls under which evolution yields socially optimal play. Finally, we characterize potential games with continuous player sets by establishing that a generalization of these games is precisely the limiting version of finite player potential games (Monderer and Shapley (1996)) which satisfy an anonymity condition.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1198

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis ; Noncooperative Games ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Externalities ; Transportation: Demand, Supply, and Congestion; Travel Time; Safety and Accidents; Transportation Noise ; Transportation Economics: Government Pricing and Policy

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Sandholm, William H.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
• (where): Evanston, IL
• (when): 1997

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/221554
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET