Why exporting countries agree voluntary export restraints : The oligopolistic power of the foreign supplier
- Location
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Extent
-
Online-Ressource
- Language
-
Englisch
- Notes
-
In: Kiel: Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW), 1997.
- Bibliographic citation
-
Kiel Working Paper ; 841
- Keyword
-
Exportbeschränkung
Oligopol
Markteintrittsstrategie
Außenhandelsbetrieb
Allgemeines Gleichgewicht
Wohlfahrtseffekt
Theorie
Schätzung
Türkei
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (where)
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Kiel, Hamburg
- (who)
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
- (when)
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2011
- Creator
- Handle
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10419/46697
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2018083005553347779719
- Rights
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
-
15.08.2025, 7:37 AM CEST
Data provider
This object is provided by:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- De Santis, Roberto A.
- ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Time of origin
- 2011
Other Objects (12)
Why exporting countries agree voluntary export restraints: The oligopolistic power of the foreign supplier
Why exporting countries agree voluntary export restraints : the oligopolistic power of the foreign supplier
Agree to agree : agreement in the minimalist programme
We Eventually Agree
Agreeing to agree
Asymmetric general oligopolistic equilibrium
Triads in Lean Management: Analyzing Buyer–Supplier-Supplier and Buyer–Supplier-Supplier’s Supplier Relationships for Zero-Defect Manufacturing
![[Come let us agree]](https://iiif.deutsche-digitale-bibliothek.de/image/2/7f53edce-6f39-4fd1-8aa8-669b12b9d286/full/!306,450/0/default.jpg)
[Come let us agree]
Movement and cyclic Agree
Evaluation of clinical practice guidelines using the AGREE instrument: comparison between data obtained from AGREE I and AGREE II
Merger externalities in oligopolistic markets
Oligopolistic equilibrium and financial constraints
Why exporting countries agree voluntary export restraints: The oligopolistic power of the foreign supplier
Why exporting countries agree voluntary export restraints : the oligopolistic power of the foreign supplier
Agree to agree : agreement in the minimalist programme
We Eventually Agree
Agreeing to agree
Asymmetric general oligopolistic equilibrium
Triads in Lean Management: Analyzing Buyer–Supplier-Supplier and Buyer–Supplier-Supplier’s Supplier Relationships for Zero-Defect Manufacturing
[Come let us agree]
Movement and cyclic Agree
Evaluation of clinical practice guidelines using the AGREE instrument: comparison between data obtained from AGREE I and AGREE II
Merger externalities in oligopolistic markets
Oligopolistic equilibrium and financial constraints
Why exporting countries agree voluntary export restraints: The oligopolistic power of the foreign supplier
Why exporting countries agree voluntary export restraints : the oligopolistic power of the foreign supplier
Agree to agree : agreement in the minimalist programme
We Eventually Agree
Agreeing to agree
Asymmetric general oligopolistic equilibrium
Triads in Lean Management: Analyzing Buyer–Supplier-Supplier and Buyer–Supplier-Supplier’s Supplier Relationships for Zero-Defect Manufacturing
[Come let us agree]
Movement and cyclic Agree
Evaluation of clinical practice guidelines using the AGREE instrument: comparison between data obtained from AGREE I and AGREE II
Merger externalities in oligopolistic markets