Agreeing to agree

Artikel

Aumann has shown that agents who have a common prior cannot have common knowledge of their posteriors for event $E$ if these posteriors do not coincide. But given an event $E$, can the agents have posteriors with a common prior such that it is common knowledge that the posteriors for $E$ \emph{do} coincide? We show that a necessary and sufficient condition for this is the existence of a nonempty \emph{finite} event $F$ with the following two properties. First, it is common knowledge at $F$ that the agents cannot tell whether or not $E$ occurred. Second, this still holds true at $F$, when $F$ itself becomes common knowledge.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 6 ; Year: 2011 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 269-287 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Subject: Agreeing theorem ; common knowledge ; common prior ; no trade theorem

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Lehrer, Ehud ; Samet, Dov
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): The Econometric Society
• (where): New Haven, CT
• (when): 2011

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.3982/TE578
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150155
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET