Arbeitspapier
R&D-hindering collusion
In an extended version of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin's (1988) R&D competition model we find a region where the game is a prisoner's dilemma: firms still invest in R&D but they would obtain a higher profit by not investing at all. In a repeated version of the game, we prove that firms implicitly tend to collude and refrain from investing in R&D, thus decreasing social welfare. When this happens, inviting firms to form a joint venture appears as a remedy to the lack of innovation efforts rather than the excess thereof.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 651
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Bacchiega, Emanuele
Lambertini, Luca
Mantovani, Andrea
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (where)
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Bologna
- (when)
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2008
- DOI
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doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4595
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Bacchiega, Emanuele
- Lambertini, Luca
- Mantovani, Andrea
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Time of origin
- 2008
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