Arbeitspapier
Perturbed best response dynamics in a hawk-dove game
We examine the impact of behavioral noise on equilibrium selection in a hawk-dove game with a model that linearly interpolates between the one- and two-population structures in an evolutionary context. Perturbed best response dynamics generates two hypotheses in addition to the bifurcation predicted by standard replicator dynamics. First, when replicator dynamics suggests mixing behavior (close to the one-population model), there will be a bias against hawkish play. Second, polarizing behavior as predicted by replicator dynamics in the vicinity of the two-population model will be less extreme in the presence of behavioral noise. We find both e.ects in our data set.
- ISBN
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978-3-86304-242-4
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 243
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
- Subject
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evolutionary game theory
perturbed best response dynamics
experiment in continuous time
hawk-dove game
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Benndorf, Volker
Martinez-Martinez, Ismael
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
- (where)
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Düsseldorf
- (when)
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2017
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Benndorf, Volker
- Martinez-Martinez, Ismael
- Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
Time of origin
- 2017