Arbeitspapier

Perturbed best response dynamics in a hawk-dove game

We examine the impact of behavioral noise on equilibrium selection in a hawk-dove game with a model that linearly interpolates between the one- and two-population structures in an evolutionary context. Perturbed best response dynamics generates two hypotheses in addition to the bifurcation predicted by standard replicator dynamics. First, when replicator dynamics suggests mixing behavior (close to the one-population model), there will be a bias against hawkish play. Second, polarizing behavior as predicted by replicator dynamics in the vicinity of the two-population model will be less extreme in the presence of behavioral noise. We find both e.ects in our data set.

ISBN
978-3-86304-242-4
Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 243

Classification
Wirtschaft
Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Subject
evolutionary game theory
perturbed best response dynamics
experiment in continuous time
hawk-dove game

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Benndorf, Volker
Martinez-Martinez, Ismael
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
(where)
Düsseldorf
(when)
2017

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Benndorf, Volker
  • Martinez-Martinez, Ismael
  • Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

Time of origin

  • 2017

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