Arbeitspapier

Separating the Hawks from the Doves: Evidence from continuous time laboratory games

Human players in our laboratory experiment received flow payoffs over 120 seconds each period from a standard Hawk-Dove bimatrix game played in continuous time. Play converged closely to the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium under a one-population matching protocol. When the same players were matched in a two-population protocol with the same bimatrix, they showed clear movement towards an asymmetric (and very inequitable) pure Nash equilibrium of the game. These findings support distinctive predictions of evolutionary game theory.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3129

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Thema
evolutionary dynamics
Hawk-Dove game
game theory
laboratory experiment
continuous time game
Dynamisches Spiel
Konflikt
Evolutionäre Spieltheorie
Test

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Oprea, Ryan
Henwood, Keith
Friedman, Daniel
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Oprea, Ryan
  • Henwood, Keith
  • Friedman, Daniel
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2010

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