Arbeitspapier
Separating the Hawks from the Doves: Evidence from continuous time laboratory games
Human players in our laboratory experiment received flow payoffs over 120 seconds each period from a standard Hawk-Dove bimatrix game played in continuous time. Play converged closely to the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium under a one-population matching protocol. When the same players were matched in a two-population protocol with the same bimatrix, they showed clear movement towards an asymmetric (and very inequitable) pure Nash equilibrium of the game. These findings support distinctive predictions of evolutionary game theory.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3129
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- Thema
-
evolutionary dynamics
Hawk-Dove game
game theory
laboratory experiment
continuous time game
Dynamisches Spiel
Konflikt
Evolutionäre Spieltheorie
Test
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Oprea, Ryan
Henwood, Keith
Friedman, Daniel
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Oprea, Ryan
- Henwood, Keith
- Friedman, Daniel
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2010