Arbeitspapier

Hobbes to Rousseau : Inequality, Institutions, and Development

We analyze the endogenous evolution of economic and political institutions and the interdependencies with the process of economic development. Favorable economic institutions ensure the appropriability of rents in form of a state of law. We study the conditions under which a state of law can be implemented under oligarchy, and when democratization is necessary. Inequality in endowments and incomes prolongs the absence of good institutions and delays democratization. Conversely, institutions shape the income distribution. Simulations illustrate how inequality affects the development process and may lead to overtaking and divergence. The implications are in line with historical and empirical evidence.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 1450

Classification
Wirtschaft
Economic History: Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations: General, International, or Comparative
Development Planning and Policy: General
Structure and Scope of Government: General
Subject
inequality
democratization
institutions
state of law
long-term development
Institutioneller Wandel
Entwicklung
Rechtsstaat
Einkommensverteilung
Demokratisierung
Verfassungsökonomik
Public Choice
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Cervellati, Matteo
Fortunato, Piergiuseppe
Sunde, Uwe
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2005

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Cervellati, Matteo
  • Fortunato, Piergiuseppe
  • Sunde, Uwe
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2005

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