Arbeitspapier

Optimal Degrees of Tranaparency in Monetary Policymaking.

According to most academics and policymakers, transparency in monetary policymaking is desirable. I examine this proposition in a small theoretical model emphasizing forward-looking private sector behavior. Transparency makes it easier for price setters to infer the central bank's future policy intentions, thereby making current inflation more responsive to policy actions. This induces the central bank to pay more attention to inflation rather than output gap stabilization. Then, transparency may be disadvantageous. It may actually be a policy-distorting straitjacket if the central bank enjoys low-inflation credibility, and there is need for active monetary stabilization policy.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: EPRU Working Paper Series ; No. 2001-01

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Jensen, Henrik
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Copenhagen, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU)
(wo)
Copenhagen
(wann)
2001

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Jensen, Henrik
  • University of Copenhagen, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU)

Entstanden

  • 2001

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