- Location
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISSN
-
2196-1093
- Extent
-
Online-Ressource
- Language
-
Englisch
- Notes
-
online resource.
- Bibliographic citation
-
Memory retrieval and harshness of conflict in the hawk–dove game ; volume:10 ; number:2 ; day:8 ; month:9 ; year:2022 ; pages:333-351 ; date:10.2022
Economic theory bulletin ; 10, Heft 2 (8.9.2022), 333-351, 10.2022
- Creator
- Contributor
-
SpringerLink (Online service)
- DOI
-
10.1007/s40505-022-00237-z
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2022120621352727796365
- Rights
-
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
-
15.08.2025, 7:31 AM CEST
Data provider
This object is provided by:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- Bilancini, Ennio
- Boncinelli, Leonardo
- Ille, Sebastian
- Vicario, Eugenio
- SpringerLink (Online service)
Other Objects (12)
Delayed response in the Hawk Dove game
Fairness and Reciprocity in the Hawk-Dove Game
Learning in a Local Interaction Hawk-Dove Game
Evolutionarily stable payoff matrix in hawk–dove games
Instability of mixed Nash equilibria in generalised Hawk-Dove game: A project conflict management scenario
Perturbed best response dynamics in a hawk-dove game
Perturbed Best Response Dynamics in a Hawk-Dove Game
Separating the hawks from the doves: Evidence from continuous time laboratory games
Separating the Hawks from the Doves: Evidence from continuous time laboratory games
Forward-looking behavior in Hawk-Dove games in endogenous networks: Experimental evidence
Separating the hawks from the doves
Equilibrium selection under limited control: An experimental study of the network Hawk-Dove game
Delayed response in the Hawk Dove game
Fairness and Reciprocity in the Hawk-Dove Game
Learning in a Local Interaction Hawk-Dove Game
Evolutionarily stable payoff matrix in hawk–dove games
Instability of mixed Nash equilibria in generalised Hawk-Dove game: A project conflict management scenario
Perturbed best response dynamics in a hawk-dove game
Perturbed Best Response Dynamics in a Hawk-Dove Game
Separating the hawks from the doves: Evidence from continuous time laboratory games
Separating the Hawks from the Doves: Evidence from continuous time laboratory games
Forward-looking behavior in Hawk-Dove games in endogenous networks: Experimental evidence
Separating the hawks from the doves
Equilibrium selection under limited control: An experimental study of the network Hawk-Dove game
Delayed response in the Hawk Dove game
Fairness and Reciprocity in the Hawk-Dove Game
Learning in a Local Interaction Hawk-Dove Game
Evolutionarily stable payoff matrix in hawk–dove games
Instability of mixed Nash equilibria in generalised Hawk-Dove game: A project conflict management scenario
Perturbed best response dynamics in a hawk-dove game
Perturbed Best Response Dynamics in a Hawk-Dove Game
Separating the hawks from the doves: Evidence from continuous time laboratory games
Separating the Hawks from the Doves: Evidence from continuous time laboratory games
Forward-looking behavior in Hawk-Dove games in endogenous networks: Experimental evidence
Separating the hawks from the doves