- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
-
1 Online-Ressource.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Evolutionarily stable payoff matrix in hawk–dove games ; volume:24 ; number:1 ; day:20 ; month:5 ; year:2024 ; pages:1-8 ; date:12.2024
BMC ecology and evolution ; 24, Heft 1 (20.5.2024), 1-8, 12.2024
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
- Urheber
-
Király, Balázs
Varga, Tamás
Szabó, György
Garay, József
- Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
-
SpringerLink (Online service)
- DOI
-
10.1186/s12862-024-02257-8
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2407292123237.910764356596
- Rechteinformation
-
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
- 14.08.2025, 10:57 MESZ
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Beteiligte
- Király, Balázs
- Varga, Tamás
- Szabó, György
- Garay, József
- SpringerLink (Online service)
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