- Location
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Extent
-
1 Online-Ressource.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Evolutionarily stable payoff matrix in hawk–dove games ; volume:24 ; number:1 ; day:20 ; month:5 ; year:2024 ; pages:1-8 ; date:12.2024
BMC ecology and evolution ; 24, Heft 1 (20.5.2024), 1-8, 12.2024
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Creator
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Király, Balázs
Varga, Tamás
Szabó, György
Garay, József
- Contributor
-
SpringerLink (Online service)
- DOI
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10.1186/s12862-024-02257-8
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2407292123237.910764356596
- Rights
-
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
- 14.08.2025, 10:57 AM CEST
Data provider
This object is provided by:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- Király, Balázs
- Varga, Tamás
- Szabó, György
- Garay, József
- SpringerLink (Online service)
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