Arbeitspapier
Corporate Governance and Leverage: Evidence from a Natural Experiment
We argue that the recent corporate governance reform in the Netherlands provides a natural experiment to explore the impact of changes in corporate governance on financing policy. We find that, relative to a control sample of comparable firms outside the Netherlands, Dutch firms significantly reduced their leverage following the passage of the reform. Our findings are consistent with the view that corporate governance improvements reduce the value of debt as a disciplining device.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 10-019/2
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
- Thema
-
Corporate Governance
Corporate Leverage
Financing Policy
Corporate Governance
Unternehmensfinanzierung
Übernahme
Niederlande
Test
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Arping, Stefan
Sautner, Zacharias
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Arping, Stefan
- Sautner, Zacharias
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2010
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