Arbeitspapier
Objectivity, Control and Adaptability in Corporate Governance
Countries appear to differ considerably in the basic orientations oftheir corporate governance structures. We postulatethe trade-off between objectivity and proximity as fundamental tothe corporate governance debate. We stress thevalue of objectivity that comes with distance (e.g. the marketoriented U.S. system), and the value of better informationthat comes with proximity (e.g. the more intrusive ContinentalEuropean model).A superior corporate governance arrangement must balance thebenefits of proximity and objectivity. In this context,we also discuss the ways in which investors have contracted aroundthe flaws in their own corporate governancesystems, pointing at the adaptability of different arrangements.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 98-064/2
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Corporate Governance
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Boot, Arnoud W.A.
Macey, Jonathan R.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
1998
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Boot, Arnoud W.A.
- Macey, Jonathan R.
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 1998
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