Arbeitspapier
Corporate Governance and Leverage: Evidence from a Natural Experiment
We argue that the recent corporate governance reform in the Netherlands provides a natural experiment to explore the impact of changes in corporate governance on financing policy. We find that, relative to a control sample of comparable firms outside the Netherlands, Dutch firms significantly reduced their leverage following the passage of the reform. Our findings are consistent with the view that corporate governance improvements reduce the value of debt as a disciplining device.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 10-019/2
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
- Subject
-
Corporate Governance
Corporate Leverage
Financing Policy
Corporate Governance
Unternehmensfinanzierung
Übernahme
Niederlande
Test
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Arping, Stefan
Sautner, Zacharias
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
-
2010
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Arping, Stefan
- Sautner, Zacharias
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2010
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