Arbeitspapier
The corporate calendar and the timing of share repurchases and equity compensation
This study examines whether the CEO uses share repurchases to sell her equity grants at inflated stock prices, a concern regularly voiced in politics and media. We find that the timing of buyback programs and equity compensation, i.e., the granting, vesting, and selling of equity, is largely determined by the corporate calendar through blackout periods and earnings announcement dates. As a consequence, share repurchases and equity compensation are positively correlated. This correlation disappears once we account for the corporate calendar and should thus not be interpreted causally. Our results do not support the conclusion that CEOs systematically misuse share repurchases at the expense of shareholders. To the contrary, equity compensation increases the propensity to launch a buyback program when buying back shares is beneficial for long-term shareholder value.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. TI 2021-101/IV
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
Payout Policy
Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- Thema
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Payout policy
share repurchases
equity-based incentives
short-termism
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Dittmann, Ingolf
Li, Amy Yazhu
Obernberger, Stefan
Zheng, Jiaqi
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2022
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Dittmann, Ingolf
- Li, Amy Yazhu
- Obernberger, Stefan
- Zheng, Jiaqi
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2022