Price authority and information sharing with competing principals

Arbeitspapier

We characterize the degree of price discretion that competing principals award their agents in a framework where agents are informed about demand and seek to pass on their unveriÖable distribution costs to consumers at the principalsí expense. Principals learn demand probabilistically and may exchange this information on a reciprocal basis. While equilibria with full price delegation never exist, partial delegation equilibria exist with and without information sharing and feature binding price caps (list prices) that prevent agents from passing on their distribution costs to consumers. Yet, these equilibria are more likely to occur with than without information sharing. Moreover, while principals exchange information when products are suffi ciently di§erentiated and downstream distribution costs are not too low, expected prices are unambiguously lower with than without information sharing. These results have potential implications for recent and ongoing antitrust investigations and damage claims in prominent sectors both in the US and the EU.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies Working Paper ; No. HEIDWP29-2022

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts ; Regulation and Industrial Policy: General ; Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce
• Thema: Competing Principals ; Delegates Sales ; Discretion ; Information Sharing ; List Prices

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Andreu, Enrique ; Neven, Damien J. ; Piccolo, Salvatore
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies
• (wo): Geneva
• (wann): 2022

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/278326
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ