Arbeitspapier
Late and Multiple Bidding in Competing Second Price
Internet auctions, such as those on eBay, are known for multiple bidding and sniping. Buyers send bids in the closing seconds of an auction, knowing that bids arriving after the closure of the auction are not counted. They also bid several times at the same auction. We model Internet auction as a dynamic multi-unit auction. This let us explain the rationality of both sniping and multiple bidding. By submitting multiple bids, buyers co-ordinate between auctions, so that all objects are finally sold and no-one has to pay too high a price. When bidders submit multiple bids, they might bid very late in the end.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 16.2004
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Auctions
- Subject
-
Auctions
Electronic Commerce
Internet
Auktion
Internet
E-Business
Auktionstheorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Stryszowska, Marta
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (where)
-
Milano
- (when)
-
2004
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Stryszowska, Marta
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Time of origin
- 2004
Other Objects (12)
Late and Multiple Bidding in Second Price Internet Auctions: Theory and Evidence Concerning Different Rules for Ending an Auction
Competing with asking prices
Competing with Asking Prices
Competing with asking prices
Resolving failed banks: Uncertainty, multiple bidding & auction design
Resolving filed banks: Uncertainty, multiple bidding & auction design
A Bidding Model of Price Formation Under Uncertainty
Some evidence on late bidding in eBay auctions
The Role of the Bidding Process in Price Determination : Jump Bidding in Sequential English Auctions
Multiple Applications, Competing Mechanisms, and Market Power
Multiple Applications, Competing Mechanisms, and Market Power
Multiple Applications, Competing Mechanisms, and Market Power
Late and Multiple Bidding in Second Price Internet Auctions: Theory and Evidence Concerning Different Rules for Ending an Auction
Competing with asking prices
Competing with Asking Prices
Competing with asking prices
Resolving failed banks: Uncertainty, multiple bidding & auction design
Resolving filed banks: Uncertainty, multiple bidding & auction design
A Bidding Model of Price Formation Under Uncertainty
Some evidence on late bidding in eBay auctions
The Role of the Bidding Process in Price Determination : Jump Bidding in Sequential English Auctions
Multiple Applications, Competing Mechanisms, and Market Power
Multiple Applications, Competing Mechanisms, and Market Power
Multiple Applications, Competing Mechanisms, and Market Power
Late and Multiple Bidding in Second Price Internet Auctions: Theory and Evidence Concerning Different Rules for Ending an Auction
Competing with asking prices
Competing with Asking Prices
Competing with asking prices
Resolving failed banks: Uncertainty, multiple bidding & auction design
Resolving filed banks: Uncertainty, multiple bidding & auction design
A Bidding Model of Price Formation Under Uncertainty
Some evidence on late bidding in eBay auctions
The Role of the Bidding Process in Price Determination : Jump Bidding in Sequential English Auctions
Multiple Applications, Competing Mechanisms, and Market Power
Multiple Applications, Competing Mechanisms, and Market Power