Arbeitspapier

The state's enforcement monopoly and the private protection of property

The modern state has monopolized the legitimate use of force. This concept is twofold. First, the state is empowered with enforcement rights; second, the rights of the individuals are (partly) restricted. In a simple model of property rights with appropriation and defense activity, we show that a restriction of private enforcement is beneficial for the property owner, even if there are no economies of scale from public protection. We emphasize the role of the state as a commitment device for a certain level of enforcement. However, commitment will only work if the state can regulate private protection. A ban of private enforcement measures can even be beneficial in situations where there would be no private enforcement at first place because the shadow of defense has a negative impact on the investments in property rights infringements. From a legal perspective, our approach emphasizes a regulation of victim behavior as opposed to the standard approach which focuses on the regulation of criminal behavior.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2011,24

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Capitalist Systems: Property Rights
Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies: Legal Institutions; Illegal Behavior
Other Economic Systems: Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
Economic History: Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation: General, International, or Comparative
Thema
Contests
Property Rights
Enforcement
Private Protection
Law
Eigentumsrecht
Rechtsdurchsetzung
Staatsgewalt
Kriminalität
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Grechenig, Kristoffel
Kolmar, Martin
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2011

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Grechenig, Kristoffel
  • Kolmar, Martin
  • Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Entstanden

  • 2011

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