Arbeitspapier
A property of solutions to linear monopoly problems
We extend the 'no-haggling' result of Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) to the class of linear multiproduct monopoly problems when the buyer's valuations are smoothly distributed. In particular we show that there is no loss for the seller in optimizing over mechanisms such that all allocations belong to the boundary of the feasible set. The set of potentially optimal mechanisms can be further restricted when the costs are sufficiently low: the optimal mechanisms use only allocations from the 'north-east' boundary of the feasible set and the null allocation.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Research Report ; No. 2010-2
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- Thema
-
multidimensional screening
price discrimination
optimal selling strategies
mechanism design
Monopol
Verkauf
Preisdifferenzierung
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Pavlov, Gregory
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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The University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
London (Ontario)
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Pavlov, Gregory
- The University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2010