Arbeitspapier

A property of solutions to linear monopoly problems

We extend the 'no-haggling' result of Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) to the class of linear multiproduct monopoly problems when the buyer's valuations are smoothly distributed. In particular we show that there is no loss for the seller in optimizing over mechanisms such that all allocations belong to the boundary of the feasible set. The set of potentially optimal mechanisms can be further restricted when the costs are sufficiently low: the optimal mechanisms use only allocations from the 'north-east' boundary of the feasible set and the null allocation.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Research Report ; No. 2010-2

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
Thema
multidimensional screening
price discrimination
optimal selling strategies
mechanism design
Monopol
Verkauf
Preisdifferenzierung

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Pavlov, Gregory
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics
(wo)
London (Ontario)
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Pavlov, Gregory
  • The University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2010

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