Persistence of monopoly and research specialization

Arbeitspapier

We examine the persistence of monopolies in markets with innovations when the outcome of research is uncertain. We show that for low success probabilities of research, the incumbent can seldom preempt the potential entrant. Then the efficiency effect outweighs the replacement effect. It is vice versa for high probabilities. Moreover, the incumbent specializes in safe” research and the potential entrant in risky” research. We also show that the probability of entry has an inverted U-shape in the success probability. Since even at the peak entry is rather unlikely, the persistence of the monopoly is high.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2009,11

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies ; Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
• Thema: Persistence of Monopoly ; Efficiency Effect ; Replacement Effect ; Stochastic Innovations ; Innovation ; Monopol ; Industrielle Forschung ; Stochastischer Prozess ; Arbeitsteilung ; Markteintritt ; Innovationswettbewerb ; Potenzieller Wettbewerb ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Weinschenk, Philipp
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2009

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32234
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ