Arithmetics of research specialization

Arbeitspapier

I model the use of research specialization in hiring as a signal of ability. I demonstrate that rewarding for specialization can make an average non-specializing candidate on average better than average specializing candidate, and vice versa. Specialization works as a good ability signal only when both good and bad candidates are very likely to churn out good projects.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Cardiff Economics Working Papers ; No. E2020/1

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Role of Economics; Role of Economists; Market for Economists ; Higher Education; Research Institutions
• Subject: specialization ; research ; job market

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Popov, Sergey V.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
• (where): Cardiff
• (when): 2020

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/250311
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET