Merger Policy to Promote Global Players? A Simple Model

Arbeitspapier

We use a simple framework where firms in two countries serve their respective domestic markets and a world market to analyze under which conditions cost-reducing mergers will be beneficial for the merging firms, the home country, and the world as a whole. For a national merger, the policies enacted by a national merger authority tend to be overly restrictive from a global efficiency perspective. In contrast, all international mergers that benefit the merging firms will be cleared by either a national or a regional regulator, and this laissez-faire approach is also globally efficient. Finally, we derive the properties of the endogenous merger equilibrium.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Munich Discussion Paper ; No. 2005-13

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices ; Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations ; Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
• Subject: merger policy ; international trade

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Haufler, Andreas ; Nielsen, Søren Bo
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
• (where): München
• (when): 2005

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.666
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/104171
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-666-9
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET