Arbeitspapier

Merger Policy and Tax Competition

In many situations governments have sector-specific tax and regulation policies at their disposal to influence the market outcome after a national or an international merger has taken place. In this paper we study the implications for merger policy when countries non-cooperatively deploy production-based taxes. We find that whether national or international mergers are more likely to be enacted in the presence of nationally optimal tax policies depends crucially on the ownership structure of firms. When all firms are owned domestically in the pre-merger situation, non-cooperative tax policies are more efficient in the national merger case and smaller synergy effects are needed for this type of merger to be proposed and cleared. These results are reversed when there is a high degree of foreign firm ownership prior to the merger.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Munich Discussion Paper ; No. 2007-39

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Regulation and Industrial Policy: General
Thema
merger regulation
tax competition
Fusionskontrolle
Steuerwettbewerb
Eigentümerstruktur
Optimale Besteuerung
Duopol
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Haufler, Andreas
Schulte, Christian
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
(wo)
München
(wann)
2007

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.2074
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-2074-1
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Haufler, Andreas
  • Schulte, Christian
  • Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät

Entstanden

  • 2007

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