Arbeitspapier
The dark side of reciprocity
Whether friendship or competitive relationships deserve to be encouraged in the workplace is not obvious a priori. In this paper we derive the conditions under which a profit-aximizing employer finds it convenient to induce a rat race among workers exhibiting horizontal reciprocity in order to obtain underpaid or unpaid extra effort. We characterize the optimal compensation scheme under both symmetric and asymmetric information about workers' actions, and we also derive conditions for our result to hold in the presence of vertical reciprocity.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2011,052
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- Thema
-
extra effort
horizontal reciprocity
negative reciprocity
Vergütungssystem
Extensives Spiel
Austauschtheorie (Soziologie)
Information
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Montinari, Natalia
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
- (wo)
-
Jena
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Montinari, Natalia
- Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
Entstanden
- 2011