Arbeitspapier
The Effectiveness of Hiring Credits
This paper analyzes the effectiveness of hiring credits. Using comprehensive administrative data, we show that the French hiring credit, implemented during the Great Recession, had significant positive employment effects and no effects on wages. Relying on the quasi-experimental variation in labor cost triggered by the hiring credit, we estimate a structural search and matching model. Simulations of counterfactual policies show that the effectiveness of the hiring credit relied to a large extent on three features: it was non-anticipated, temporary and targeted at jobs with rigid wages. We estimate that the cost per job created by permanent hiring credits, either countercyclical or time-invariant, in an environment with flexible wages would have been much higher.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 11248
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models: Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models; Quantile Regressions; Social Interaction Models
Field Experiments
- Thema
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hiring credit
labor demand
search and matching model
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Cahuc, Pierre
Carcillo, Stéphane
Le Barbanchon, Thomas
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
- (wo)
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Bonn
- (wann)
-
2017
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Cahuc, Pierre
- Carcillo, Stéphane
- Le Barbanchon, Thomas
- Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2017
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The Subsidy Trap: Explaining the Unsatisfactory Effectiveness of Hiring Subsidies for the Senior Unemployed
Investment Tax Credits
The Value of Hiring through Referrals
Trade Credits and Bank Credits in International Trade: Substitutes or Complements?
Behavioral responses to subsidies in risky investment decisions and the effectiveness of tax credits and grants
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Investment Tax Credits
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