Arbeitspapier

Money talks

We study credible information transmission by a benevolent Central Bank. We consider two possibilities: direct revelation through an announcement, versus indirect information transmission through monetary policy. These two ways of transmitting information have very different consequences. Since the objectives of the Central Bank and those of individual investors are not always aligned, private investors might rationally ignore announcements by the Central Bank. In contrast, information transmission through changes in the interest rate creates a distortion, thus, lending an amount of credibility. This induces the private investors to rationally take into account information revealed through monetary policy.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ECB Working Paper ; No. 1091

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
Money and Interest Rates: General
Monetary Policy
Thema
Information
Interest Rates
monetary policy
Geldpolitik
Glaubwürdigkeit
Politische Kommunikation
Zentralbank
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Hoerova, Marie
Monnet, Cyril
Temzelides, Ted
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
European Central Bank (ECB)
(wo)
Frankfurt a. M.
(wann)
2009

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Hoerova, Marie
  • Monnet, Cyril
  • Temzelides, Ted
  • European Central Bank (ECB)

Entstanden

  • 2009

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