Arbeitspapier
On the Implications of Introducing Cross-Border Loss-Offset in the European Union
This article investigates a tax competition model where countries compete for capital and profits of multinational enterprises (MNEs) through statutory tax rates and cross-border loss-offset provisions, which allow a transfer of foreign subsidiaries’ losses to the parent company. A joint implementation of full cross-border loss-relief is welfare maximizing, because it ensures production efficiency and no profit shifting in equilibrium. Local governments choose zero level of the loss-relief in a noncooperative equilibrium, if only capital is mobile and relax the loss-offset, when MNEs engage in profit shifting. Therefore, allowing multinationals to undertake international tax planning activities may be welfare-improving in our model.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5436
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: Firm
Multinational Firms; International Business
- Thema
-
cross-border loss-offset
tax competition
profit shifting
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kalamov, Zarko
Runkel, Marco
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
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Munich
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kalamov, Zarko
- Runkel, Marco
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2015