Arbeitspapier

On the Implications of Introducing Cross-Border Loss-Offset in the European Union

This article investigates a tax competition model where countries compete for capital and profits of multinational enterprises (MNEs) through statutory tax rates and cross-border loss-offset provisions, which allow a transfer of foreign subsidiaries’ losses to the parent company. A joint implementation of full cross-border loss-relief is welfare maximizing, because it ensures production efficiency and no profit shifting in equilibrium. Local governments choose zero level of the loss-relief in a noncooperative equilibrium, if only capital is mobile and relax the loss-offset, when MNEs engage in profit shifting. Therefore, allowing multinationals to undertake international tax planning activities may be welfare-improving in our model.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5436

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: Firm
Multinational Firms; International Business
Thema
cross-border loss-offset
tax competition
profit shifting

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kalamov, Zarko
Runkel, Marco
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2015

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kalamov, Zarko
  • Runkel, Marco
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2015

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