Allocation of Authority when a Person is not a Robot

Arbeitspapier

We formalize a conception of authority, which is commonly defined as the right of controlling a person’s actions embedded in human assets in sociology. Due to the inalienable property of human assets, the contractible formal authority is hard to verify and enforce, while real authority usually diverges from formal authority. Inefficiency tends to arise when a task is not routine or can not be done by a robot. Using a framework of incomplete contract, we show that allocation of formal authority, as an instrument to mitigate the inefficiency, is determined by features of tasks and specificity of assets, and the relationship between the resources. Monitoring is then introduced to fine tune value of delegation.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Munich Discussion Paper ; No. 2007-23

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity ; Labor Contracts ; Firm Organization and Market Structure
• Thema: Transaction of human assets ; Real Authority ; Formal Authority ; Delegation ; Monitor ; Autorität ; Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie ; Kooperative Führung ; Arbeitsvertrag ; Unvollständiger Vertrag ; Leistungsbeurteilung ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Li, Jianpei ; Wu, Yanhui
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
• (wo): München
• (wann): 2007

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.1995
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/104221
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-1995-1
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ