Artikel
Characterization and uniqueness of equilibrium in competitive insurance
This paper provides a complete characterization of equilibria in a game-theoretic version of Rothschild and Stiglitz's (1976) model of competitive insurance. I allow for stochastic contract offers by insurance firms and show that a unique symmetric equilibrium always exists. Exact conditions under which the equilibrium involves mixed strategies are provided. The mixed equilibrium features (i) cross-subsidization across risk levels, (ii) dependence of offers on the risk distribution, and (iii) price dispersion generated by firm randomization over offers.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 12 ; Year: 2017 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 1349-1391 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Economics of Contract: Theory
Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- Thema
-
Asymmetric and private information
mechanism design
oligopoly
economics of contracts
insurance
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Luz, Vitor Farinha
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
The Econometric Society
- (wo)
-
New Haven, CT
- (wann)
-
2017
- DOI
-
doi:10.3982/TE2166
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Luz, Vitor Farinha
- The Econometric Society
Entstanden
- 2017
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