Artikel

Characterization and uniqueness of equilibrium in competitive insurance

This paper provides a complete characterization of equilibria in a game-theoretic version of Rothschild and Stiglitz's (1976) model of competitive insurance. I allow for stochastic contract offers by insurance firms and show that a unique symmetric equilibrium always exists. Exact conditions under which the equilibrium involves mixed strategies are provided. The mixed equilibrium features (i) cross-subsidization across risk levels, (ii) dependence of offers on the risk distribution, and (iii) price dispersion generated by firm randomization over offers.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 12 ; Year: 2017 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 1349-1391 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Economics of Contract: Theory
Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
Thema
Asymmetric and private information
mechanism design
oligopoly
economics of contracts
insurance

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Luz, Vitor Farinha
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The Econometric Society
(wo)
New Haven, CT
(wann)
2017

DOI
doi:10.3982/TE2166
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Luz, Vitor Farinha
  • The Econometric Society

Entstanden

  • 2017

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