Artikel
Characterization and uniqueness of equilibrium in competitive insurance
This paper provides a complete characterization of equilibria in a game-theoretic version of Rothschild and Stiglitz's (1976) model of competitive insurance. I allow for stochastic contract offers by insurance firms and show that a unique symmetric equilibrium always exists. Exact conditions under which the equilibrium involves mixed strategies are provided. The mixed equilibrium features (i) cross-subsidization across risk levels, (ii) dependence of offers on the risk distribution, and (iii) price dispersion generated by firm randomization over offers.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 12 ; Year: 2017 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 1349-1391 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Economics of Contract: Theory
Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- Thema
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Asymmetric and private information
mechanism design
oligopoly
economics of contracts
insurance
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Luz, Vitor Farinha
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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The Econometric Society
- (wo)
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New Haven, CT
- (wann)
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2017
- DOI
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doi:10.3982/TE2166
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Luz, Vitor Farinha
- The Econometric Society
Entstanden
- 2017