Arbeitspapier
Equilibrium in the symmetric Hirshleifer contest: Uniqueness and characterization
The symmetric two-player Hirshleifer (1989) contest is shown to admit a unique equilibrium. The support of the equilibrium strategy is finite and includes, in particular, the zero expenditure level. We also establish a lower bound for the cardinality of the support and an upper bound for the undissipated rent.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 286
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- Subject
-
Contests
mixed-strategy equilibrium
rent dissipation
uniqueness
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Ewerhart, Christian
Sun, Guang-Zhen
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
University of Zurich, Department of Economics
- (where)
-
Zurich
- (when)
-
2018
- DOI
-
doi:10.5167/uzh-151260
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Ewerhart, Christian
- Sun, Guang-Zhen
- University of Zurich, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2018
Other Objects (12)
Characterization and uniqueness of equilibrium in competitive insurance
Equilibrium Uniqueness with Perfect Complements
On uniqueness and stability of symmetric equilibria in differentiable symmetric games
Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium Points in Bimatrix Games
Gradual adjustment and equilibrium uniqueness under noisy monitoring
Topological Conditions for Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Networks
Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
Network Externalities, Dominant Value Margins, and Equilibrium Uniqueness
Existence, uniqueness and stability of market equilibrium in oligopoly markets
Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium for Linear-Convex Stochastic Differential Games
Independence and Uniqueness of the Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium in Social Networks
Uniqueness of equilibrium states in some models of interacting particle systems
Characterization and uniqueness of equilibrium in competitive insurance
Equilibrium Uniqueness with Perfect Complements
On uniqueness and stability of symmetric equilibria in differentiable symmetric games
Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium Points in Bimatrix Games
Gradual adjustment and equilibrium uniqueness under noisy monitoring
Topological Conditions for Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Networks
Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
Network Externalities, Dominant Value Margins, and Equilibrium Uniqueness
Existence, uniqueness and stability of market equilibrium in oligopoly markets
Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium for Linear-Convex Stochastic Differential Games
Independence and Uniqueness of the Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium in Social Networks
Uniqueness of equilibrium states in some models of interacting particle systems
Characterization and uniqueness of equilibrium in competitive insurance
Equilibrium Uniqueness with Perfect Complements
On uniqueness and stability of symmetric equilibria in differentiable symmetric games
Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium Points in Bimatrix Games
Gradual adjustment and equilibrium uniqueness under noisy monitoring
Topological Conditions for Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Networks
Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
Network Externalities, Dominant Value Margins, and Equilibrium Uniqueness
Existence, uniqueness and stability of market equilibrium in oligopoly markets
Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium for Linear-Convex Stochastic Differential Games
Independence and Uniqueness of the Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium in Social Networks