Arbeitspapier

Bank competition and bargaining over refinancing

We model mortgage refinancing as a bargaining game involving the borrowing household, the incumbent lender, and an outside bank. In equilibrium, the borrower's ability to refinance depends both on the competitiveness of the local banking market and on the cost of switching banks. We find empirical support for the key predictions of our model using a unique data set containing the population of mortgages in Belgium. In particular, households' refinancing propensities are positively correlated with the number of local branches and negatively correlated with local mortgage market concentration. Moreover, households are more likely to refinance externally if they already have a relation with more than one bank, but the effect is mitigated if their current mortgage lender has a branch locally.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: NBB Working Paper ; No. 422

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
mortgage markets
refinancing
bargaining
bank competition
switching costs

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Emiris, Marina
Koulischer, François
Spaenjers, Christophe
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
National Bank of Belgium
(wo)
Brussels
(wann)
2022

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Emiris, Marina
  • Koulischer, François
  • Spaenjers, Christophe
  • National Bank of Belgium

Entstanden

  • 2022

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