(M)oral hazard?

Arbeitspapier

Would you go to the dentist more often if it were free? Observational data is here used to analyze the impact of full-coverage insurance on dental care utilization using different identification strategies. The challenge of assessing the bite of moral hazard without an experimental study design is to separate it from adverse selection, as agents act on private and generally unobservable information. By utilizing a quasi-experimental feature of the insurance scheme the moral hazard effect is identified on observables, and by having access to an instrument the effect is identified with IV. Moral hazard is assessed using both difference-in-differences and cross-sectional estimations.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance ; No. 642

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies ; Analysis of Health Care Markets
• Subject: Asymmetric information ; Moral Hazard ; Health Insurance ; Porpensity Score Matching ; Private Krankenversicherung ; Dentalprodukt ; Moral Hazard ; Adverse Selection ; Asymmetrische Information ; Theorie ; Schätzung ; Schweden

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Grönqvist, Erik
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI)
• (where): Stockholm
• (when): 2006

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56304
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET