Arbeitspapier
Skewed norms under peer pressure: Formation and collapse
This paper shows that peer pressure may lead to dynamic convergence to a norm that is skewed with respect to preferences in society, yet is endogenously upheld by the population. Moreover, a skewed norm will often be more sustainable than a representative norm. This may explain the skewness of various social and religious norms. By furthermore interpreting a norm as a political regime, we show that biased regimes can be sustained even without the existence of a powerful group with coherent interests. We analyze the pattern by which political regimes collapse and relate it to contemporary revolutions and mass protests.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Memorandum ; No. 15/2014
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Cultural Economics; Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology: General
Cultural Economics: Religion
- Thema
-
Peer pressure
Social norm
Revolution
Protest movement
Alienation
Religion
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Michaeli, Moti
Spiro, Daniel
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Oslo, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Oslo
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Michaeli, Moti
- Spiro, Daniel
- University of Oslo, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2014