Arbeitspapier
Skewed norms under peer pressure: Formation and collapse
This paper shows that peer pressure may lead to dynamic convergence to a norm that is skewed with respect to preferences in society, yet is endogenously upheld by the population. Moreover, a skewed norm will often be more sustainable than a representative norm. This may explain the skewness of various social and religious norms. By furthermore interpreting a norm as a political regime, we show that biased regimes can be sustained even without the existence of a powerful group with coherent interests. We analyze the pattern by which political regimes collapse and relate it to contemporary revolutions and mass protests.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Memorandum ; No. 15/2014
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Cultural Economics; Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology: General
Cultural Economics: Religion
- Subject
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Peer pressure
Social norm
Revolution
Protest movement
Alienation
Religion
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Michaeli, Moti
Spiro, Daniel
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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University of Oslo, Department of Economics
- (where)
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Oslo
- (when)
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2014
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Michaeli, Moti
- Spiro, Daniel
- University of Oslo, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2014