Arbeitspapier

Skewed norms under peer pressure: Formation and collapse

This paper shows that peer pressure may lead to dynamic convergence to a norm that is skewed with respect to preferences in society, yet is endogenously upheld by the population. Moreover, a skewed norm will often be more sustainable than a representative norm. This may explain the skewness of various social and religious norms. By furthermore interpreting a norm as a political regime, we show that biased regimes can be sustained even without the existence of a powerful group with coherent interests. We analyze the pattern by which political regimes collapse and relate it to contemporary revolutions and mass protests.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Memorandum ; No. 15/2014

Classification
Wirtschaft
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Cultural Economics; Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology: General
Cultural Economics: Religion
Subject
Peer pressure
Social norm
Revolution
Protest movement
Alienation
Religion

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Michaeli, Moti
Spiro, Daniel
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Oslo, Department of Economics
(where)
Oslo
(when)
2014

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Michaeli, Moti
  • Spiro, Daniel
  • University of Oslo, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2014

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